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Can international migration promote better institutions at home by raising the demand for political 
accountability?  In  order  to  examine  this  question,  we  designed  a  behavioral  measure  of  the 
population’s  desire  for  better  governance.  A  postcard  was  distributed  to  households  with  the 
pledge that, if enough postcards were mailed back, results from a survey module on perceived 
corruption would be made public in the national media. Using data from a tailored household 
survey,  we  examine  the  determinants  of  our  behavioral  measure  of  demand  for  political 
accountability  (i.e.  of  undertaking  the  costly  action  of  mailing  the  postcard),  and  isolate  the 
positive effect of international emigration using locality level variation. The estimated effects are 
robust to the use of instrumental variables, including both past migration and macro shocks in the 
migrant destination countries. We find that the estimated effects can be mainly attributed to those 
who emigrated to countries with better governance, especially return migrants. 
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§ An important area that has not deserved the same share of attention is 
the role of international migration in the improvement of institutions, which can be crucial 
to economic development, as surveyed by Acemoglu et al. (2005). 
The traditional perspective regards emigration as a “safety valve” or “outside option” that 
allows  individuals  unhappy  with  political  institutions  to  leave  their  home  country.
** 
Emigration could therefore be detrimental to the quality of the domestic political system 
(a form of “brain drain”) by undermining the demand for political accountability, and also 
by hurting the capacity to supply better quality home institutions if those who leave are 
also those most capable of providing these services.  
One can however argue that emigration may promote improved political institutions in 
several  ways:  current  emigrants  may  create  strong  diaspora  effects  whereby  they 
influence political change (via supply, i.e. by influencing local authorities, or via demand, 
for instance through intensified contact of the domestic population with better institutions 
abroad); if return emigrants benefited from an enriching experience abroad, these effects 
can also translate into improvements in the quality of the domestic political institutions 
                                                 
§ Evidence of the positive effects of remittances is provided, among others, by Edwards and Ureta (2003) 
for El Salvador, and Yang (2008) for the Philippines. Dustmann and  Kirchkamp (2003), Mesnard and 
Ravallion (2006) and Batista et al. (2010b) examine the role of return migration. Gould (1994), Rauch and 
Trindade (2002), Kugler and Rapoport (2007), Iranzo and Peri (2009)  and Javorcik et al. (2011) evaluate 
the relationship between migrant networks, trade and FDI. The possibility of a ‘brain gain’ as opposed to 
traditional ‘brain drain’ claims is empirically supported by Beine et al. (2008) and Batista et al. (2010a). 
** Hirschman (1970) proposed the “exit” vs. “voice” dichotomy, according to which citizens unhappy with 
the  domestic  situation  either  choose  to  emigrate  (exit)  or  to  protest  and  contribute  to  political  change 
(voice). In this setting emigration may be understood as a “safety valve”, which releases protest intensity in 
the home political system and therefore reduces demand for political improvements. 3 
 
(via supply, by direct participation in the political system, or via demand, by bringing 
increased awareness and demand for political accountability). 
Theoretically,  therefore,  emigration  might  impact  political  institutions  differently 
depending on the specific context in which it happens. This empirical question is very 
much unanswered in the current literature. In this paper we will test the hypothesis that 
international  migration  experiences  promote  better  institutions  at  home  by  raising  the 
demand for political accountability.  
In order to examine this research question, we needed to capture the population’s demand 
for  political  accountability.  For  this  purpose,  we  designed  and  implemented  a  simple 
voting experiment that provides us with a behavioral measure of the demand for better 
governance  at  home.  Following  a  survey  of  perceived  corruption  in  public  services, 
respondents were asked to mail a pre-stamped postcard if they wanted the (anonymous) 
results of this survey to be made publicly available in the media. This was to happen if at 
least 50% of the survey respondents would mail the postcard back. Note that this voting 
experiment is not a randomized control trial, but only a simple way to elicit a behavioral 
measure of demand for political accountability. It is likely superior to more standard self-
reported measures from survey data as these latter may suffer from “conformity bias”, 
meaning that survey respondents may desire to conform to the perceived anti-corruption 
message  of  the  survey.  This  is  indeed  a  hypothesis  that  we  cannot  reject  using  the 
empirical evidence obtained in this paper, and hence we take our behavioral measure of 
the demand for better institutions as a methodological contribution of our paper. 
Using tailored data from our purposely designed and conducted household survey in Cape 
Verde, we examine the determinants of voting behavior in our experiment, and isolate the 
positive effect of international emigration on the demand for political accountability. For 
this purpose, we consider a simple political economy framework, taking voting behavior 4 
 
as the outcome of an expected cost-benefit analysis. In this setting, we need to control for 
potentially varying voting costs (such  as the distance to the post, or the easiness and 
frequency of posting mail) and for alternative characteristics affecting varying perceived 
voting  benefits  (such  as  confidence  in  surveyors,  income  or  family  structure).  These 
variables are provided to us by our detailed survey, customized to examine this research 
question. Overall, we find that international emigration seems to positively impact the 
demand for improved political accountability. The effect is especially sizable for the case 
of migrants to countries with better governance, and, as one could expect, it also seems 
stronger for return migrants relative to current migrants. 
Related  empirical  evidence  on  the  impact  of  emigration  on  the  quality  of  political 
institutions in origin countries is scarce, but there are a few recent contributions. Docquier 
et  al.  (2010)  present  cross-country  evidence  showing  that  over  the  period  1975-2000 
unskilled  emigration  seems  to  have  positively  impacted  institutional  quality  in  origin 
countries (namely on measures of democracy and economic freedom), although the effect 
of skilled emigration is ambiguous in the short run. The simulations they perform point, 
however, and very interestingly to significant institutional gains from “brain drain” in the 
long run, after taking into account incentive effects of the brain drain on human capital 
formation. Li and McHale (2009) provide a detailed description of possible mechanisms 
through which skilled emigration could affect political and economic institutions at home, 
and present cross-country evidence consistent with the view that over 1990-2006 there 
may indeed be such a positive effect on political institutions (particularly on political 
accountability),  but  not  on  economic  institutions.  Spilimbergo  (2009)  offers  related 
evidence on the effect of foreign-educated students in promoting democracy in their home 
countries. He uses evidence from 1960 to show that foreign education seems to promote 
democracy in home countries when it is acquired in democratic countries. 5 
 
These empirical contributions are consistent with our results, but they cannot distinguish 
between supply and demand forces, nor capture the mechanisms underlying the identified 
effects because they use aggregate data and explore cross-country variation. Our paper 
uses tailored household survey data for a single country, which allows focusing more 
specifically  on  the  impact  of  emigration  on  the  demand  for  improved  political 
accountability,  while  aiming  at  also  discriminating  between  the  impact  of  return  and 
current  migrants.  This  approach  is  made  possible  because  we  propose  an  original 
behavioral measure of the desire for improved governance, which allows us to rely on 
within country level variation, instead of the traditional cross-country source of variation. 
Our reliance on data for a single country may however raise external validity concerns 
and, in that sense, we believe that the contributions made by these different lines of work 
are, albeit necessarily distinct, very much complementary and fruitful to be pursued. 
In the remainder of the paper, we begin by presenting an overview of our country of 
interest, Cape Verde, as our results should be understood in the setting where the postcard 
experiment  was  conducted.  In  section  3,  we  then  turn  to  presenting  our  experimental 
design,  while  describing  the  theoretical  framework  supporting  our  empirical  strategy. 
Section 4 presents the tailored household survey used in our empirical work, including the 
main descriptive statistics. These data are then used to perform the empirical analysis with 
results presented and discussed in section 5. Section 6 presents concluding remarks. 
I.  Cape Verde: a short introduction to the country  
Cape Verde is a nine-island country off the coast of West Africa with 441,000 inhabitants, 
according to the latest INE (2002) census. Its population is concentrated particularly in the 
capital island of Santiago, but is overall very homogeneous in religious and ethnic terms, 
particularly relative to sub-Saharan standards: the index of religious fractionalization as 6 
 
computed by Alesina et al. (2003) is 7.66% 
†† (corresponding to 96% of the population 
being  Roman  Catholic);  whereas  the    ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  index  takes  the 
value 41.74% (comparable to countries such as Spain or New Zealand, and in contrast 
with the top fractionalization observed in 20 sub-Saharan countries where the index takes 
a value of more than 80%). 
In terms of institutional history, the country was a Portuguese colony until 1975, when it 
became  independent  and  a  socialist  regime  was  put  in  place  -  a  common  trend  in 
Lusophone Africa at this time. The first free elections only occurred in 1991, but a stable 
democracy has been in place thereafter. In addition, the country benefits from very good 
governance, particularly for sub-Saharan African standards: Cape Verde ranks 47th out of 
180 countries in Transparency International' s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2008, only 
(slightly) behind Botswana and Mauritius; the country was awarded the Best Control of 
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2005, again after Botswana, by the World Bank. 
In terms of economic performance, the country is currently ranked by the World Bank as 
a “Lower Middle-Income” economy, and had a GDP per capita of 5900 PPP-Adjusted 
Dollars in 2003, according to Heston et al.  (2006).  Its economic  growth performance 
clearly exceeded the Sub-Saharan African average for GDP per capita growth over 1980-
2004 of 0.6%, again according to Heston et al. (2006). Indeed, Cape Verde was the third 
fastest  country  in  terms  of  per  capita  growth  out  of  the  45  sub-Saharan  countries  in 
Heston  et  al.  (2006),  after  Equatorial  Guinea  (11%  average  annual  growth  rate)  and 
Botswana (5%), both these countries being rich in natural resources and with exports 
accounting for a large fraction of their GDP (47% and 55%, respectively). Cape Verde 
stands out growing at an average annual rate of 4.4% (4.1% over 1981-1990, 5.8% over 
1991-2000) but with exports accounting for only 20% of its GDP and no natural resource 
                                                 
†† This index is computed as one minus the Herfindahl index of group shares, and expresses the probability 
that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong to different groups. 7 
 
abundance - rather the opposite, as droughts and famines were recurrent characteristics of 
the country’s history. 
Indeed, droughts and famines were closely related to the massive emigration phenomenon 
that characterizes this country. According to estimates from Batista et al. (2010), based on 
adjusted data for the stock of immigrants in most destination countries, there are around 
100,000 Cape Verdean current emigrants, or about 23% of the population. An additional 
striking feature of Cape Verdean emigration is the magnitude of “brain drain”: according 
to Docquier and Marfouk (2006), 67.5% of the educated labor force of Cape Verde lives 
abroad. This is arguably the largest such number in the African continent, although these 
results  have  been  qualified  by  Batista  et  al.  (2010)  as  depending  particularly  on  the 
definition of educational attainment. Finally, the magnitude of international remittances 
received in Cape Verde is impressive: international remittances account for 16% of GDP 
over  1987-2003  (World  Bank,  2006),  according  to  official  numbers,  likely 
underestimated, as they do not include informal channels (neither legal nor illegal). This 
magnitude is also especially important given its large relative scale compared to aid and 
foreign direct investment inflows – international remittances have always surpassed FDI 
and have been close to the level of foreign aid, particularly since 2000. 
Finally, Cape Verde is classified by the House of Freedom as “among the freest media 
environments in Africa”. Reporters Without Borders ranks Cape Verde 44 (out of 175 
countries in the world) in terms of press freedom, close to France, Spain and Argentina. 
Quoting from the House of Freedom website: “Many media outlets are state operated, 
although there are a growing number of private publications and broadcast outlets. The 
law  requires  broadcasters  to  obtain  operating  licenses,  and  government  approval  is 
needed  to  establish  new  newspapers  and  other  publications.  However,  there  were  no 
reports that the government denied or revoked licenses for political reasons in 2007, and 8 
 
two new private newspapers were launched in September. Six independent radio stations 
broadcast regularly in Cape Verde, and there are two foreign-owned television stations in 
addition  to  the  state-owned  radio  and  television  stations.  The  government  does  not 
generally restrict access to the media that it controls, although opposition candidates 
reported difficulty in accessing airtime on the state broadcasters before the February 
2006  presidential  election.  Self-censorship  is  widespread  among  journalists,  however, 
and has been one of the largest obstacles to the creation of a truly free press. Geographic 
barriers  and  harsh  terrain  in  a  country  made  up  of  several  islands  also  constitute 
impediments to the distribution of newspapers and other media products, including the 
internet, which was accessed by just over 8 percent of the population in 2007. However, 
there were no reports that the government restricted internet access or monitored e-mail 
messages, and foreign broadcasts are uncensored.” 
II.  Experimental design and empirical strategy 
Postcard experiment: creating a behavioral measure of demand for better governance  
This  paper  examines  the  hypothesis  that  international  emigration  may  contribute  to 
promote  the  demand  for  better  governance  at  home.  To  empirically  evaluate  this 
hypothesis, an experiment was conducted such that individual respondents to a survey on 
perceived corruption in public services were offered the opportunity to (anonymously) 
make  the  results  of  this  survey  publicly  available  in  the  national  media  for  political 
accountability purposes.
‡‡  
                                                 
‡‡ Postcards were anonymous in the sense that respondents “did not have to write their names anywhere in 
the postcard”. This is the message that the interviewers were instructed to convey to the survey respondents. 
However, each postcard had a 6-digit number that we were able to match to each interviewed household. In 
this way we knew the household and respondent characteristics for each received postcard. 9 
 
In  order  to  have  the  survey  results  publicized  in  the  media,  survey  respondents  were 
invited  to  participate  in  a  “special  referendum”  immediately  after  they  finished 
responding to the corruption questionnaire. They were offered the opportunity to vote for 
political accountability by taking the incentive-compatible voting action of mailing a pre-
paid postcard. The postcard read “I wish that the conclusions of the survey on the quality 
of national public services (health, education, justice,…), conducted by the University of 
Oxford (UK) in the first months of 2006 to 1000 households in the islands of Santiago, 
São Vicente, Santo Antão, and Fogo, are made public in the Cape Verdean media.” The 
written message was accompanied by interviewers saying to each respondent: “it is very 
important that you put the postcard in the mail if you want that Cape-Verdeans are able 
to require higher quality in the public services of CV.” 
§§ 
The results on perceived corruption in public services were to be made public if 50% or 
more of the postcards were received back. To add credibility to the survey organizers’ 
dissemination obligations, a ‘Media Contract’
*** was emphasized by a wide series of news 
and interviews broadcasted or published in the national television, radio and newspapers 
while the survey was being conducted in the country.
††† 
                                                 
§§ Note that survey respondents were subject to an average 60-minute interview asking very specific and 
explicit questions about the need to bribe public officials or know and be able to influence them in order to 
be provided public services. The reason why the postcard euphemistically refers to “the quality of public 
services” instead of the buzzword “corruption” is that we would like to minimize behavior correlated with 
corruption-related public opinion, and hence elicit a more accurate behavioral measure of the demand for 
political accountability. 
*** The expression “Media Contract” refers to an agreement between the survey fieldworkers and the survey 
respondents that, provided enough postcards are mailed back, the results of the survey would be made 
public in the national media. 
††† In particular, these were the news pieces broadcasted and published: 
•  National Television Station - RTC - news broadcasted in the main prime-time news at 8pm (24/01/06); 
•   Radio Nova - interview broadcasted in news (24/01/06); 
•   National Radio – interview broadcasted in the news (24/01/06); 
•   Radio Comercial - news based on press note (24/01/06); 
•   Newspaper Expresso das Ilhas - news based on press note and Radio Nova interview (25/01/06); 
•   Newspaper A Semana, based on an interview (26/01/06). 
For additional details and evidence, see http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/resprogs/corruption/cv/cv.htm. 10 
 
Note that this voting experiment is not a randomized control trial, but only a simple way 
to elicit a behavioral measure of demand for political accountability. Using a behavioral 
measure is likely superior to more standard self-reported measures from survey data as 
these latter may suffer from “conformity bias”, meaning that survey respondents are more 
likely  to  conform  to  what  they  believe  are  the  interviewers’  expectations  on  anti-
corruption attitude. This hypothesis cannot be rejected from the empirical evidence we 
obtain in this paper, as discussed in section IV. 
Theoretical framework 
In  order  to  test  whether  international  emigration  increases  the  desire  for  political 
accountability  at home,  one needs to begin by  setting a framework to  understand the 
determinants of voting in our postcard experiment.  
Political economy theories of turnout and voting potentially relevant for our purposes are 
in large number, as surveyed by Merlo (2006). Following the traditional literature on 
electoral participation, we model voter turnout as the outcome of an expected cost-benefit 
analysis.
‡‡‡ 
Since the postcard distributed to the survey respondents was pre-stamped, the cost of 
voting in our experiment has to do with the opportunity cost of mailing the postcard. This 
cost potentially depends on how familiar the individual is with posting mail, and how 
practical it is for the individual to post mail – individuals who are not used to posting mail 
or for whom it is harder to post mail will likely face higher costs; the same applying to 
individuals with higher labor income.  
                                                 
‡‡‡ Downs (1957) first provided a ‘calculus of voting’ framework, which was later formalized by Tullock 
(1967) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968). Note that because of the simple nature of our voting experiment 
(i.e. a simple decision of whether to vote or not), we can abstract from strategic voting considerations and 
safely assume sincere voting behavior. 11 
 
The  expected  benefit  of  mailing  the  postcard  has  to  do  with  a  desire  for  political 
accountability  and  this  is  the  main  focus  of  our  analysis.  However,  the  literature 
emphasizes that we should note the expected nature of an individual’s benefit calculation. 
Crucially,  survey  respondents  who  are  more  confident  about  the  trustworthiness  and 
independence  of  the  foreign  institution  sponsoring  the  survey  (as  well  as  about  the 
reliability of the Cape Verdean postal system) will likely attribute a higher probability to 
the public dissemination of the results on perceived corruption.  
The perceived benefit is finally a function of other variables directly affecting the desire 
for  political  accountability.  We  are  most  interested  in  the  effect  of  international 
emigration, but we will need to take into account factors like gender, age, education, 
wealth, or family ties (see, for instance, Alesina and Giuliano, 2009). 
Empirical strategy 
The voting decision of an individual respondent to our survey can be summarized by the 
following latent variable model: 
) 0 ( 1
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According  to  this  model,  the  decision  to  vote  (and  therefore  the  demand  for  better 
political accountability) made by an individual i is given by Vi = 1. This voting decision 
will occur whenever the (unobserved) expected net benefit from voting,  , is positive. 
The expected net benefit from voting first depends on the local proportion of migrants, 
Ml, with impact  1 a  on voting behaviour, which will turn out to be our main estimate of 12 
 
interest.
§§§  Our  main  explanatory  variable  is  computed  according  to  the  following 
formula: 
Proportion of international migrants within the spatial area of residence of the household  
 
Note that the definition of “migrants” includes both current and return migrants. This 
implies that the effect of the local proportion of migrants on an individual’s demand for 
good  governance  includes  both  direct  and  indirect  effects.  In  a  locality  there  will  be 
effects arising directly from the presence of return migrants, but also indirect effects due 
to  the  influence  return  migrants  exert  on  their  peers  (think,  for  instance,  of  neighbor 
families with no migrants who become more sensitive to the issue of governance after 
talking to a return migrant neighbor who lived in the US for some years). An additional 
source of indirect migrant impact on the demand for accountability by local residents is 
the influence of current migrants who keep in touch with family and friends. In this way, 
this “proportion of migrants within the spatial area of residence of the household” can be 
understood as a proxy for the  frequency  of meetings  with migrants a resident in this 
locality (who is not necessarily a migrant and does not necessarily have a migrant at 
home) can have. Recall that even though our results intuitively point to the importance of 
return  migrants,  this  framework  is  sufficiently  wide  to  encompass  the  impact  on  the 
locality of origin of current migrants – though their contacts with family and friends, for 
instance. 
Second, our empirical specification includes a vector of individual, household and locality 
characteristics  Xi  determining  costs  and  benefits  of  mailing  the  voting  postcard.  This 
vector includes individual demographics (e.g. age as a determinant of the easiness to mail 
                                                 
§§§ Note that the concept of locality is that of a census area in Cape Verde, which would roughly correspond 
to a small neighborhood where one would expect social interaction to occur. 13 
 
the postcard, but also of the demand for accountability), and individual controls for how 
familiar someone is with posting mail, and how practical this is for her. In addition, there 
is an individual indicator of confidence in the foreign institution sponsoring the survey 
and  experiment.  At  the  household  level,  vector  Xi  includes  variables  such  as  family 
structure and asset ownership, which are likely determinants of an individual’s subjective 
valuation of the benefit of improved governance. At the locality level, we control for the 
average expenditure per capita, as well as for the fraction of local residents working in 
agriculture, construction and retail trade, which may again influence the perceived benefit 
of better governance. All regressions also include island fixed effects. 
We estimate this empirical model using probit regressions. The source of variation that 
allows  us  to  identify  our  main  coefficient  of  interest,  1 a ,  is  variation  of  migration 
behavior across different localities, after controlling for a number of individual, household 
and local level characteristics.  
We should emphasize that, unlike family level variation, using locality-level variation 
mitigates  self-selection  concerns  based  on  unobservable  characteristics:  unobserved 
ability (which may increase both migration and demand for good governance) can be 
correlated  across  family  members  but  not  likely  at  the  locality  level.  Indeed,  using 
locality-level variation should allow us to average out unobserved heterogeneity at least to 
some extent and hence avoid the most evident endogeneity problems. Moreover, the fact 
that Cape Verde is a small very homogeneous country as described in section 2, rules out 
the  most  obvious  (potentially  omitted)  factors  that  could  simultaneously  promote 
migration and accountability demand at the locality-level. 14 
 
III.  Data description: tailored household survey 
Household Survey Design and Conduction 
Our empirical work is based upon a household survey on migration and the quality of 
public  services  purposely  designed  to  answer  our  research  questions.  The  survey  was 
conducted in Cape Verde from December 2005 to March 2006 by the authors, who were 
affiliated to the University of Oxford. 
The  survey  questionnaire  was  submitted  to  a  representative  sample  of  1066  resident 
households (997 complete interviews) in 5% of the 561 census areas of Cape Verde. This 
sample provided information on both resident non-migrants and return migrants, and also 
on a large sample of current emigrants. The questionnaire included two modules: one on 
perceived quality/corruption of public services; and the other on migration characteristics 
(including  full  migration  histories)  of  the  household.  The  interviewed  household 
representative  (someone  aged  at  least  30  years  old)  was  asked  to  specify  socio-
demographic  characteristics  of  all  members  of  the  household,  including  children  who 
already  lived  elsewhere.  Moreover,  he  was  asked  to  characterize  all  migration  spells 
within the household, including who emigrated, where and when. Finally, there were some 
questions  regarding  the  economic  situation  of  the  household  such  as  living  standards, 
income or whether any member of the family received remittances in the previous year. The 
English translation for the full questionnaire is available at 
 http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/resprogs/corruption/cv/questcveng.pdf. 
The tailored data collection consisted of survey (face-to-face) interviews conducted by 
teams of local interviewers and the authors, who recruited and trained the local teams 
making sure that each interviewer had at least a total of 18 hours of training in groups of 15 
 
2-3  individuals.  Training  included  lectures  on  the  content/objectives  of  the  survey; 
answering the questionnaire; and piloting (at least once per interviewer). 
The  sampling  process  was  such  that  sampled  census  areas  were  chosen  randomly 
weighting by the number of households, and households within a census area were chosen 
randomly using standard techniques (nth house, with second visits tried in the same day). 
The eligibility condition for a household to be interviewed was family residence in the 
country  anytime  in  1985-2006.  The  requirement  condition  for  a  respondent  within  a 
household to be interviewed was to be aged at least 30 years old. 
There are two imperfections to the random sampling of households in the survey. One is 
differences in attempted interviews in the different census areas, and the other is non-
responses. We use weighted data to account for these problems, although differences to 
unweighted  data  are  negligible.  Data  collected  from  non-respondents  on  their  gender, 
approximate  age,  approximate  schooling,  and  approximate  income  are  used  for  this 
purpose. 
Note that the data we collected on individual income are limited in the sense that they 
were  not  provided  by  about  half  of  the  survey  respondents.  This  implies  that  our 
regressions will be run with 452 observations at most throughout the paper.
**** 
Additional details on the fieldwork and survey can be found at  
http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/resprogs/corruption/cv/cv.htm. 
                                                 
**** We conducted an attrition analysis to evaluate the impact of the missing observations on our baseline 
econometric results (with and without controls) using multiple imputation methods. We found that simply 
comparing the effect of local migration on voting behaviour when we take out the observations that do not 
contain income information has a sizable impact on the magnitude and significance of the estimated results. 
However, when we use multiple imputation methods to recover the missing information, the magnitude of 
estimated coefficients falls but the statistical significance is kept. This suggests that the missing income 
observations can possible influence the magnitude of estimated effects which would presumably be smaller 
if  income  were  available  for  all  respondents  in  the  sample,  but  that  the  positive  sign  and  statistical 
significance of our estimates remains in all possible specifications. Note moreover that results are fairly 
stable (if anything improving as one increases the number of imputations) regardless of the number of 
imputations performed. 16 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
We now briefly characterize the information from our household survey. The results in 
Table  1  show  that,  relative  to  residents  in  Cape  Verde,  current  emigrants  tend  to  be 
slightly  disproportionately  males  and  in  their  prime-working  years  (21-50  years  old). 
They are also more likely to have post-secondary education. Return migrants are strongly 
disproportionately males (both in comparison with residents and current migrants) and are 
mostly aged over 50 years old. They tend to be less educated than current migrants, but 
still overperform residents in terms of the likelihood of a post-secondary education. 
The figures for migration flows in the period 2000-2005 coming out of our survey are 
relatively close to the percentages found in the last INE (2002) census for the period 
1995-2000,  both  for  migrant  outflows  and  returns.  These  numbers  are  about  4%  of 
residents for the annual outflows of emigrants; and 20% of emigrants for the return flows 
of emigrants. 
Another interesting fact about Cape Verdean migration coming out of our survey is that 
Portugal and the USA account for respectively about 55% and 20% of the total emigration 
flows,  figures  similar  to  those  coming  out  of  the  INE  (2002)  census.  Most  other 
destinations are European countries (France with 12%, Netherlands and Luxemburg with 
2% each) and Brazil (with 3%). 
Finally, we should note that in the end only 43% of the postcards were returned to us. 
IV.  Empirical results 
In this section, we summarize the main empirical results in this paper. In particular, we 
present, interpret and discuss the robustness of our estimates of a ‘demand for political 
accountability gain’ arising from international emigration. 17 
 
Baseline results 
The  baseline  estimation  of  the  probability  of  a  given  survey  respondent  mailing  the 
postcard she was given is presented in column (1) of Table 2. Without controlling for any 
other covariates (except for urban locality and island fixed effects), there seems to be a 
striking  statistically  significant  difference  between  the  postcard  voting  probability  of 
localities with more and less migrants relative to residents (+0.94pp in the probability of 
voting for each additional 1pp in the local fraction of emigrants, including both current and 
return  migrants).  Controlling  for  a  number  of  individual  and  household  level  relevant 
covariates, the observed voting differences are basically kept, as is shown in columns (2-4) 
in Table 2. The signs of all significant coefficients are as expected and do not vary as 
additional controls are included. Because there could be a concern about the potential for 
omitted variable bias, in column (5) of Table 2, we add a number of locality-level controls, 
such  as  the  average  private  consumption  expenditure  per  capita  in  the  locality  or  the 
occupational  structure  of  the  locality.  Despite  the  inclusion  of  all  these  controls,  the 
magnitude and significance of the estimated effect remains basically the same. We also 
worry  that  international  migration  may  be  proxying  for  important  local  financial 
characteristics,  which  raises  the  question  of  whether  international  remittances  may  also 
matter as determinants of the desire for better governance. It does not seem the case since 
the results in column (6) show that including the local proportion of households receiving 
international remittances has an economic and statistically insignificant impact and almost 
does not affect the estimated coefficients and significances of the other posting determinants 
included in the regression. 
Our baseline estimates are therefore presented in column (5) of Table 2. An interesting 
estimated effect is that of a strong negative income/wealth effect on the demand for more 
accountability. Having annual labor income with a negative estimated coefficient would be 18 
 
difficult to interpret directly as a negative income effect as this could simply be proxying 
the opportunity cost (time value) of mailing the postcard. However, this effect also shows 
strongly for asset ownership: wealthier people seem to value less the benefits of political 
accountability, which is consistent with the findings of Minier (2001) that democracy is not 
a normal  good.  At the local level, though, the results consistently  point to the average 
expenditure per capita as positively influencing postcard mailing behavior. 
Baseline robustness checks  
We next proceed to evaluate the  robustness  of  our  estimate effects. Given the existing 
evidence on “brain gain”, namely as found by Batista et al. (2010), we start by addressing 
the  question  of  whether  local  education  affects  the  way  local  international  migration 
generates a desire for political accountability. As is shown in columns (1) - (3) of Table 3, 
controlling for local educational attainment (namely intermediate secondary and secondary 
schooling) basically does not change the sign, magnitude and statistical significance of the 
impact  of  local  migration  on  the  demand  for  political  accountability.  Post-secondary 
education, however, increases the size of the migration effects, even though the positive 
coefficient on post-secondary education is not significant at conventional levels. 
A potential concern with our estimated effects is that the probability of mailing a postcard 
may depend on the actual experience and perception of corruption by survey respondents. 
This is investigated in columns (4) - (5) of Table 3. Indeed, we find it to be the case: those 
who perceive more corruption in the health and education sectors (the sectors with which 
most respondents had contact with) are significantly more likely to mail the postcard. The 
impact of perceived corruption somewhat affects the magnitude and significance of the 
impact of international emigration, but it does so in a way that is not systematically upward 
or downwards. Overall, the sign, order of magnitude and broad statistical significance of the 
effect of international migration are kept throughout the different specifications. This effect 19 
 
points  to  an  intuitive,  crucial  role  of  perceived  corruption  in  creating  incentives  for 
improved demand for accountability. 
Another  important  issue  regarding  the  validity  of  our  exercise  has  to  do  with  properly 
controlling for the cost of mailing the postcard and the trustworthiness when doing so. 
Columns (6) - (9) of Table 3 show that the sign, significance and magnitude of the different 
estimated coefficients on local international emigration do not seem to be strongly affected 
by the choice of these controls. In fact, none of these controls ever becomes statistically 
significant in our estimated specifications. This is consistent with the idea that, although 
incentive-compatible, the costs of mailing the voting postcard are of small importance for 
our purposes. 
Finally, the last column in Table 3 shows what happens when all alternative controls are 
used  simultaneously  in  a  single  regression.  The  main  coefficient  of  interest  keeps  a 
magnitude similar to the magnitudes estimated when using other important controls, and 
keeps significant at the 5% level despite the loss of observations implied by using all 
controls simultaneously. 
Mechanics 1: migrant destination 
Having established the relevance of local migration in determining voting behavior in our 
experimental  setting,  it  is  reasonable  to  wonder  about  the  mechanisms  underlying  this 
result. How is local migration affecting behavior? One dimension of interest in answering 
this question is to look at the destination of the local migrants and examine how it affects 
the results. We consider the two main migrant destinations from Cape Verde: Portugal and 
the United States. A first comparison of the effects of local migrants to Portugal and the US 
is displayed in columns (1) - (2) of Table 4. With and without controls, the results are 
striking in that only emigrants to the US seem to have a sizable and significant impact on 20 
 
the  desire  for  better  governance.  The  effects  of  local  migrants  to  Portugal  are  not 
statistically significant.  
Mechanics 2: current vs. return migrants 
Further in this line of investigation, we can distinguish between the effects of current and 
return migrants by country of destination: as is displayed in columns (1) – (2) of Table 5, 
there are overall striking results showing that the magnitude and significance of effects are 
much higher for return than for current migrants, regardless of their country of destination. 
This is an intuitive result, as the actual presence of individuals with migrant experience is 
more likely to induce effects in their community of residence after their return than while 
they are still away. Note also that the effects of both return and current migrants to the 
United States are positive (although insignificant for the case of current migrants), whereas 
the effect of migrants returning from Portugal is actually negative.  
Robustness checks: self-selection 
How can we best ensure that the estimated local migration effects are truly causing the 
demand for accountability? One might conjecture that selection (for instance, on observable 
characteristics such as education) may be driving our findings. To examine this possibility, 
we estimated the differences in means between localities with and without strong migration 
to Portugal (meaning that these locations have a number of migrants destined to Portugal 
that is equal to at least 5% of the resident population), and we did the same with migration 
to the United States. Our results are displayed in Table 6.  
The picture that comes out of our analysis is that households in areas prone to migration to 
Portugal are usually less well off than in areas prone to migration to the United States, 
although these seem to possess above mean assets that potentially allow them to overcome 
the financial costs of an international move. We also find that migrants to Portugal tend to 21 
 
originate in areas where agriculture and construction (as opposed to services, such as retail 
trade)  are  dominant,  the  opposite  being  true  for  migrants  to  the  United  States.  Most 
importantly,  the  educational  profile  in  areas  with  strong  migration  to  Portugal  is  the 
opposite of areas with strong migration to the United States: it is evident from Table 6 that 
the most educated migrants have the US as their destination instead of Portugal, which 
makes sense given the higher costs involved (financial, but also in terms of language or 
distance, for instance). Note finally that there is a slightly higher perception of corruption in 
the health sector in the areas with strong migration to Portugal. 
Given this profile, it is very much desirable that we control for local educational attainment 
in our regressions evaluating the impact of migration per destination country. This is done 
in columns (3) – (5) of Table 4 and in columns (3) – (5) of Table 5. The effects of education 
are not visible at the aggregate, when the impact of all migrants to different destinations is 
considered as shown in Table 4. Indeed, it is only when we break our analysis down into 
current and return migrants that the impact becomes apparent. In this case, displayed in 
Table 5, the most striking dimension of selectivity in migration is also the one impacting 
our results the most: tertiary education. After controlling for tertiary education, the impact 
of return migration from Portugal becomes significantly negative – this can perhaps be 
related to the fact that there was no higher education supply in Cape Verde until 1995 and 
that Portugal was the usual destination to obtain a tertiary degree. Apart from this strong 
impact on the coefficient from return migration from Portugal, the estimated results are not 
very  sensitive  to  this  or  the  other  dimensions  among  which  migrants  seem  to  select 
themselves when choosing a migration destination.  
This result indicates that self-selection is not likely to underlie the impact of migration on 
the demand for political accountability. Indeed, it is more likely that migrant assimilation of 
the  accountability  norms  in  the  country  of  destination  is  a  better  explanation  for  this 22 
 
impact.
†††† Notice, for instance, the latest Transparency International (2009) cross-country 
governance ranking: the United States are placed 19
th in the world, whereas Portugal is 
ranked 35
th and Cape Verde 46
th. This evidence can be interpreted as the experience of 
emigrants to the US being more conducive to promoting demand for better governance than 
that of emigrants to Portugal. Also, in relation to the identified negative impact of return 
migrants  from  Portugal,  one  should  bear  in  mind  that  the  baseline  destinations  against 
which migrants to the US and Portugal are being compared are mostly European, such as 
France and the Netherlands, which rank closer to the US in terms of governance. 
Robustness check: potential endogeneity and instrumental variable estimation 
Even though we obtain supportive evidence that observable self-selection does not seem to 
explain our estimated results, there may still be endogeneity concerns related to potential 
unobserved heterogeneity and locality level omitted variables. For this reason, we now re-
estimate the baseline regressions in the paper using instrumental variables.  
We use two sets of instrumental variables: first, we compute 5-year lagged local migrant 
stocks based on the full individual migration history available for all household members in 
our survey; second, we use external sources of destination (unemployment rates, nominal 
GDP per capita, and GDP growth rates in the US and Portugal) in the ten years before the 
survey was made; these variables are aggregated using a weighted sum in which the weight 
is the 5-year lagged local migrant stock to each destination relative to the (5-year lagged) 
overall stock of migrants to that specific destination in each of the ten years being used – 
this weight can be understood as a (5-year lagged) proxy for migration networks in the 
relevant destination country, which combined with macro information from the destination 
                                                 
†††† This is consistent with the findings of Fidrmuc and Doyle (2004) and Spilimbergo (2009), which also 
provide evidence supportive of migrant assimilation effects in the destination country. Fidrmuc and Doyle 
(2004) focus on Czech and Polish migrants and also find that self-selection (in terms of both political 
attitudes and economic characteristics) is not likely to explain migrants’ political attitudes. Spilimbergo 
(2009) describes how the political attitudes of migrants differ depending on the political characteristics of 
the destination countries. 23 
 
country should constitute an exogenous source of variation for migration, allowing us to 
identify our coefficients of interest.  Note that the weighting procedure guarantees that there 
is enough variation to identify our effects of interest at the locality level. The second set of 
instruments  also  allows  us  to  test  for  over-identification  in  all  the  three  estimated 
specifications, as well as provides us with a set of stronger instruments – note that lagged 
instrument  strength  could  be  a  problem  for  certain  regressions,  namely  as  displayed  in 
column (7) of Table 7.  
After checking that the instruments we use seem strong and exogenous in all possible 
specifications in Table 7, it is also reassuring to observe that the estimates we obtain are 
not substantially different from the estimates obtained using probit methods. This finding 
points  to  the  small  importance  of  any  endogeneity  concerns  at  the  local  level,  after 
controlling for all relevant covariates.  
Robustness check: Alternative measures of the demand for accountability 
One additional potential concern with our analysis is that our postcard experiment may not 
be  exactly  measuring  a  desire  for  political  accountability.  In  order  to  strengthen  our 
argument that it is the case, we use a survey variable that asks the respondent very directly 
whether he or she agrees or disagrees (in a 1-7 scale) with the statement: “As a common 
citizen of Cape Verde,  I believe I should require competence in the public services (health 
centers, schools, courts, police) that are aimed at my needs.”  
This is a direct survey question about the self-reported own demand for accountability of 
the public services, which we can use to verify whether the determinants of postcard voting 
behavior are similar. This analysis is shown in column (9) of Table 2 and in columns (8) – 
(9) of Tables 4 and 5. The results are reassuring in the sense that the sign and significance 
of the main estimated coefficients are kept when using this self-reported measure of demand 24 
 
for better governance - except for column (9) of Table 2, which has a p-value of only 
12.6%. Indeed, in Table 4, we see that the impact of migration to the US is also strongly 
positive and significant, whereas that of migration to Portugal is statistically insignificant. 
Looking at Table 5 in order to detail by current and return migration status, the same feature 
is still prevalent: return migration from the US is a powerful positive determinant of the 
demand for accountability, whereas current migration and return migration to Portugal are 
not statistically significant.  
Overall, the most salient feature of using self-reported survey data instead of our postcard 
behavioral measure is that the magnitude of the estimated effects is clearly much larger 
using  survey  data,  which  could  be  related  to  a  ‘conformity  bias’  caused  by  survey 
respondents desire to conform to the perceived anti-corruption message of the survey. 
Mechanics 3: Direct and social effects of local migration 
In summary, the evidence we gathered points to international emigration to countries with 
good governance (and in particular to the presence of return migrants) as promoting the 
demand for political accountability in origin countries.  
We should emphasize that our focus is on the impact of locality-level migration. The 
variable we use, the “proportion of migrants within the spatial area of residence of the 
household” can be understood as a proxy for the frequency of meetings with migrants 
someone can have (someone who is not necessarily a migrant and does not necessarily 
have a migrant at home). The higher this proportion, the more likely it will be to interact 
with migrants and become more open to demanding accountability. 
Note that the effects of local migration include both direct and indirect effects. Return 
migrants,  for  instance,  should  have  a  direct  impact  through  themselves,  but  also  an 
indirect impact because of the social interaction that is likely to occur at the locality 25 
 
(think, for instance, of neighbor families with no migrants who become more sensitive to 
the issue of governance after talking to a neighbor who lived in the US for some years). 
Current migrants can also contribute to indirect effects through communication with their 
network of friends and family back home, which may make those in the home country 
more sensitive and open to demand political accountability.  
The empirical question we leave unanswered is then about the different magnitude of the 
direct  and  indirect  effects  identified  at  the  local  level.  If  additional  data  on  migrant 
networks became available, this could be an important way forward in the literature. 
V.  Concluding remarks 
This  paper  aims  at  contributing  to  the  understanding  of  a  largely  unmeasured  but 
extremely important potential effect of international emigration: the impact of migration 
on institutional quality, a determinant of economic growth.  
Our findings point to an overall positive impact of international emigration on the demand 
for improved political accountability in the country of origin we study. In particular, our 
results  emphasize  the  importance  of  the  destination  country  of  migrants:  effects  are 
stronger  for  migrants  to  countries  with  better  governance.  Our  work  also  indicates  a 
stronger impact of return migrants actually back to the origin country, relative to current 
emigrants which can only indirectly influence their networks in the home country. 
We  naturally  recognize  that  international  emigration  likely  affects  the  supply  side  of 
domestic political institutions as well, a part of the lively ongoing “brain drain” vs. “brain 
gain” debate. Effects could presumably be negative if there is positive selection in current 
emigration flows or could be positive in presence of skilled return migrants. This is a very 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Cape Verdean individuals depending on migrant status. 
  
Non-Migrants  Current 
Migrants  Return Migrants 
Sample Size       
  4997  907  241 
Gender       
Male  47.95%  51.99%  64.46% 
       
Age       
0-10 years  21.39%  0.35%  2.42% 
11-20 years  28.63%  11.19%  4.85% 
21-30 years  12.91%  33.92%  5.45% 
31-40 years  13.05%  25.00%  17.58% 
41-50 years  10.14%  20.45%  15.76% 
51-60 years  4.44%  8.04%  11.52% 
61-70 years  4.24%  0.87%  18.79% 
71-80 years  3.80%  0.17%  20.61% 
81-90 years  1.19%  0.00%  3.03% 
>91 years  0.02%  0.00%  0.00% 
       
       
Education (males aged 15-64)       
No Education  3.72%  3.6%  5.2% 
Pre-school  1.54%  0.7%  0.0% 
Alphabetized  11.35%  8.2%  14.3% 
Primary  59.69%  62.4%  50.7% 
Intermediate Secondary  18.79%  9.9%  19.5% 
Secondary  1.12%  0.4%  3.9% 
Post-Secondary  3.78%  14.9%  6.5% 
Source: Own survey.       
 
 
 Table 2: Probability of mailing voting postcard in columns (1)-(6). Probability of self-reported own demand for accountability in column (7), scaled 1-7. Marginal effects of probit 
estimates in columns (1)-(6). Ordered probit estimates in column (7). 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
0.9419  0.9446  1.0103  1.0724  1.1034  1.0886  2.0218  Proportion of international migrants 
(relative to residents) in locality  (0.3465)***  (0.3512)***  (0.3623)***  (0.3510)***  (0.3859)***  (0.3677)***  (1.3204) 
Trust in Oxford University    0.0077  0.0211  0.0228  0.0334  0.0348  0.0365 
    (0.0232)  (0.0231)  (0.0226)  (0.0238)  (0.0237)  (0.0665) 
Habit of posting    0.0045  0.0083  0.0100  0.0089  0.0092  -0.0152 
    (0.0132)  (0.0127)  (0.0127)  (0.0137)  (0.0138)  (0.0267) 
Male      -0.0863  -0.0928  -0.0751  -0.0751  0.1954 
      (0.0485)*  (0.0467)**  (0.0485)  (0.0485)  (0.1179)* 
Age      0.0207  0.0161  0.0131  0.0140  -0.0602 
      (0.0134)  (0.0143)  (0.0143)  (0.0142)  (0.0304)** 
Age^2      -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0001  0.0004 
      (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0003) 
Individual labor income      -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0003  -0.0003  0.0001 
      (0.0001)**  (0.0001)**  (0.0001)**  (0.0001)**  (0.0003) 
Number of children        0.0205  0.0212  0.0215  0.0189 
        (0.0120)*  (0.0120)*  (0.0121)*  (0.0296) 
Household asset ownership        -0.1401  -0.1242  -0.1244  -0.0016 
        (0.0626)**  (0.0651)*  (0.0647)*  (0.1569) 
        0.9789  0.6916  -0.9512  Average private consumption expenditure 
per capita in locality          (0.6637)  (0.7866)  (1.8530) 
        -0.8688  -1.2906  -0.1134  Fraction of residents working in 
agriculture in locality          (0.5572)  (0.9234)  (2.1112) 
        -0.5909  -0.7994  -6.8096  Fraction of residents working in 
construction in locality          (1.1277)  (1.1626)  (2.5307)*** 
        1.2200  0.9100  4.2588  Fraction of residents working in retail 
trade in locality          (1.6264)  (1.7060)  (3.3857) 
          0.9963    Fraction of households receiving 
international remittances in locality            (1.3944)   
Observations  452  452  452  452  452  452  451 
Urban locality dummy and island fixed effects included in all regressions.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at locality level.  




Table 3: Probability of mailing postcard. Marginal effects of probit regressions. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
1.1091  1.0818  1.3132  0.9140  1.1349  0.9889  1.0639  0.9920  0.9012  1.0104  Proportion of international migrants (relative to 
residents) in locality  (0.3863)***  (0.4054)*** (0.3708)***  (0.4334)**  (0.4159)***  (0.4066)**  (0.3813)***  (0.3680)***  (0.3780)**  (0.4157)** 
-0.0471                  0.5362  Ratio of residents completing relative to residents 
not completing 9 years of schooling in locality  (0.2704)                  (0.3314) 
  -0.3184                -2.0897  Ratio of residents completing relative to residents 
not completing 12 years of schooling in locality    (0.4014)                (0.7537)*** 
    1.8460              6.1358  Ratio of residents completing relative to residents 
not completing 15 years of schooling in locality      (1.1037)*              (1.9907)*** 
Perceived corruption in health sector        0.0381            0.0150 
        (0.0147)***            (0.0182) 
Perceived corruption in education sector          0.0382          0.0364 
           (0.0154)**          (0.0191)* 
Confidence in postal system            -0.0144        -0.0061 
            (0.0263)        (0.0288) 
Waits to walk by postbox              -0.0366      -0.0195 
              (0.1955)      (0.2044) 
Gives (taxi) driver to post              0.1933      0.0552 
              (0.1696)      (0.2303) 
Gives to family member to post              0.0884      -0.0237 
              (0.1390)      (0.1515) 
Gives to mailman              0.3767       
              (0.2607)       
Goes to postbox on purpose              0.0945      0.0180 
               (0.1167)      (0.1287) 
Time distance to postbox                -0.0078    -0.0128 
                (0.0149)    (0.0219) 
Comfort in posting mail                  0.0119  0.0358 
                  (0.0130)  (0.0251) 
Observations  452  452  452  426  400  435  451  443  445  363 
All regressions include same controls as baseline regression in column (5) of Table 2.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at locality level. 
  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 33 
 
Table 4: Probability of mailing voting postcard in columns (1)-(7). Probability of self-reported own demand for accountability in columns (8)-(9), scaled 1-7. Marginal effects of probit estimates 
in columns (1)-(7). Ordered probit estimates in columns (8)-(9).  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
1.1210  0.5435  0.6185  0.7998  0.6865  0.1818  0.2358  -3.0466  -0.3748 
Proportion of international migrants to Portugal (relative 












2.7384  2.6239  2.6069  2.5595  2.6833  2.3141  3.1322  11.0254  12.6180  Proportion of international migrants to USA (relative to 
residents) in locality  (0.8777)***  (1.0761)**  (1.0271)**  (1.1184)**  (0.9900)***  (1.1519)**  (1.1275)***  (2.1924)***  (1.6359)***
    -0.0343              Ratio of residents completing relative to residents not 
completing 9 years of schooling in locality      (0.3374)             
      -0.3994            Ratio of residents completing relative to residents not 
completing 12 years of schooling in locality        (0.3812)           
        1.1284          Ratio of residents completing relative to residents not 
completing 15 years of schooling in locality          (1.0349)         
Perceived corruption in health sector            0.0372       
            (0.0148)**       
Perceived corruption in education sector              0.0390     
              (0.0157)**     
Controls Included  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  452  452  452  452  452  426  400  451  451 
All regressions include same controls as baseline regression in column (5) of Table 2.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at locality level. 





Table 5: Probability of mailing voting postcard in columns (1)-(7). Probability of self-reported own demand for accountability in columns (8)-(9), scaled 1-7. Marginal effects of probit 
estimates in columns (1)-(7). Ordered probit estimates in columns (8)-(9). 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
2.0057  0.9979  0.8934  0.9949  1.8130  0.7794  0.9772  -4.2651  -2.0208  Proportion of current international migrants to Portugal 
(relative to residents) in locality  (1.1713)*  (1.3858)  (1.4444)  (1.3717)  (1.4379)  (1.5497)  (1.5515)  (3.2703)  (2.9193) 























Proportion of current international migrants to USA 
(relative to residents) in locality 
(2.1526)  (3.0738)  (3.0037)  (3.1214)  (2.8120)  (3.8085)  (3.3864)  (7.2504)  (7.0402) 
-4.8152  -4.9271  -6.0974  -4.0434  -6.6494  -7.0375  -5.8158  -4.4922  0.9119  Proportion of international return migrants to Portugal 
(relative to residents) in locality  (2.4159)**  (2.8707)*  (3.6964)*  (3.3599)  (2.4733)***  (3.5251)**  (3.4314)*  (12.3565)  (12.8589) 
4.5445  5.0953  4.7343  5.1888  4.2942  5.7620  5.0397  19.7322  19.8166  Proportion of international return migrants to USA 
(relative to residents) in locality  (2.5979)*  (2.3956)**  (2.4130)**  (2.4798)**  (2.3635)*  (2.7759)**  (2.5711)**  (6.9132)***  (7.1887)*** 
    0.1610              Ratio of residents completing relative to residents not 
completing 9 years of schooling in locality      (0.3662)             
      -0.2466            Ratio of residents completing relative to residents not 
completing 12 years of schooling in locality        (0.3932)           
        2.0197          Ratio of residents completing relative to residents not 
completing 15 years of schooling in locality          (0.8948)**         
Perceived corruption in health sector            0.0375       
            (0.0153)**       
Perceived corruption in education sector              0.0370     
              (0.0162)**     
Controls Included  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  452  452  452  452  452  426  400  451  451 
All regressions include same controls as baseline regression in column (5) of Table 2.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at locality level. 




Table 6: Descriptive statistics for survey respondents in areas with strong migration to Portugal and in areas with strong migration to the United States.  
 
Strong migration to Portugal  Strong migration to United States 
-0.0001     0.0726  Male 
(0.0500)  (0.0732) 
1.18987  0.8926  Age  (1.4803)  (2.0500) 
-82.8924  19.6443  Individual labor income  (26.9850)***  (41.7703) 
0.1787  -0.3183  Number of children  (0.2490)  (0.2903) 
0.1252  -0.0280  Household asset ownership  (0.0317)***  (0.0564) 
0.2551  -0.1278  Trust in Oxford University  (0.1089)**  (0.1679) 
-0.3219  -0.2356  Habit of posting  (0.1967)  (0.2681) 
0.0077  0.0316  Average private consumption expenditure per capita in locality  (0.0058)  (0.0112)*** 
0.0322  0.0017  Fraction of residents working in agriculture in locality  (0.0043)***  (0.0047) 
0.0227  -0.0181  Fraction of residents working in construction in locality  (0.0029)***  (0.0026)*** 
-0.0057  -0.0119  Fraction of residents working in retail trade in locality  (0.0024)**  (0.0021)*** 
0.0028  0.0279  Fraction of households receiving international remittances in locality  (0.0020)  (0.0044)*** 
-0.0239  0.0886  Ratio of residents completing relative to residents not completing 9 years of 
schooling in locality  (0.0229)  (0.0479)* 
-0.0265  0.0448  Ratio of residents completing relative to residents not completing 12 years of 
schooling in locality  (0.0110)**  (0.0200)** 
-0.0097  0.0172  Ratio of residents completing relative to residents not completing 15 years of 
schooling in locality  (0.0031)***  (0.0058)*** 
0.4074  -0.1839  Perceived corruption in health sector  (0.2149)*  (0.2659) 
-0.0358  -0.3119  Perceived corruption in education sector  (0.1845)  (0.2377) 
Strong migration to a certain destination is defined as migrants to that destination representing at least 5% of the resident population. Table shows mean difference relative to 
areas where migration to the same destination is not strong. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at locality level.  




Table 7: Probability of mailing voting postcard in columns (1)-(2), (4)-(5) and (7)-(8). Probability of self-reported own demand for accountability in columns (3), (6) and (9). 
Instrumental variable estimates. 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
1.0298  1.4380  1.8467              Proportion of international migrants (relative 
to residents) in locality  (0.3895)*** (0.3472)***  (1.0169)*             
      -1.0262  -0.4735  -0.3474        Proportion of international migrants to 
Portugal (relative to residents) in locality        (1.8587)  (1.5247)  (2.8333)       
      2.7575  3.3261  7.7153        Proportion of international migrants to USA 
(relative to residents) in locality        (0.9659)***  (0.9731)***  (1.5838)***       
            1.2976  1.6291  0.7949  Proportion of current international migrants to 
Portugal (relative to residents) in locality              (9.0557)  (1.4478)  (2.4863) 
            3.3171  -0.6921  4.4871  Proportion of current international migrants to 
USA (relative to residents) in locality              (5.6915)  (5.8877)  (6.7337) 
            -2.7566  -4.8785  -0.8931  Proportion of international return migrants to 
Portugal (relative to residents) in locality              (11.2768)  (3.6941)  (8.3697) 
            1.9758  4.9559  9.6918  Proportion of international return migrants to 
USA (relative to residents) in locality              (3.6264)  (3.2493)  (4.8695)** 
Instrument Set  A  B  B  A  B  B  A  B  B 
F-Statistics on Excluded Instruments in First 


















Over-identification test - P-value  NA  0.18  0.42  NA  0.33  0.76  NA  0.15  0.38 
Controls Included  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  452  452  451  452  452  451  452  452  451 
Instrument set A includes 5-year lagged regressors of interest. Instrument set B uses macroeconomic variables at destination weighted by 5-year lagged local migration stock size 
indicators, as described in main text. Controls in all specifications are the same as in baseline regression - column (5) of Table 2.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at locality level. 
  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 